

# Research into Progression of a Safe Active Mitigation System for Fragment Impact Threats

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# Presentation Coverage


- Background.
- Impact Threat:
  - Dealing with impact threats,
  - Requirements, Safety, etc.,
- Original design concept.
- Early work on active system.
- Developments of new sensor :
  - Discrimination of Non-threatening strike.
- Firing sub-system evaluation.
- Proposed new system design:
  - System safety.
- Conclusions.

# Background


- Impact Threats:
  - IM Bullet and Fragment threats – wide velocity range (800-2500 m/s)
  - Fragments - less penetrative than bullets but greater energy.
  - Outcomes may be SDT, XDT, DDT, deflagration, burning, no reaction.
- Dealing with impact threats:
  - Passive protection: (No Energetics employed)
    - Cases/barriers to reduce penetration velocities or break-up projectile.
    - Design modifications e.g. use of shock-reduction liners.
    - Can be easier to achieve on warheads than motors.
  - Active protection: (Energetics or reactive materials used)
    - Our concentration here on confinement-release types.
    - Noted some doubts on their safety.
    - None seen to be fast enough to cope !

# Research on original active concept

- Aimed to vent motor case to prevent DDT or BVR.
- As EM response development times are fast - (S/XDT (100 $\mu$ s), DDT (100ms)) then could we:
  - Arm and fire a venting device safely? We thought Yes!
- Impact sensor & velocity measure based on fibre-optic cable:
  - Trials from original concept onward to practical system.
- Confinement relief developed:
  - Taken on from ex RARDE LOVUM Programme, well tested,
  - Line Cutting Charge - Ag sheathed, filled HNS;
  - Showed we could get 'soft effect' on EM.




# CONCEPT – INITIAL ARCHITECTURE



# Trials on Initial system

- System trialled
  - Power supply
  - Twin FO cables
  - Discriminator
  - Detonator
  - LCC
  - Mechanical safe-arm
- System worked well, within the available time frame, & was improved  
BUT
  - Not multi-strike capable,
  - Could not discriminate non-threatening strikes,
  - Was too bulky and massive for a number of applications,
  - Continuous power was required for sense & pre-charge to fire.



# Aims of New Research Initiative

New & more stringent goals set for new initiative:

- Improve detector & discriminator components to give:
  - Multi-shot capability (and “soldier –proof”)
  - Ability to identify non-threatening impacts.
- Act ONLY on detection of a threatening strike, to then:
  - Initiate a mitigation system reliably,
    - Within an acceptably short time,
    - Without on-board electrical power.
- Continue to address aspects on safety.
- Obtain reduced mass/volume & simpler devices

## Sensor – Research into PVdF use


- PVdF (polyvinylidene di-fluoride) seemed attractive.
- Electrically polarisable, flexible, light, rugged, cheap.
- Piezoelectric and pyroelectric properties.
  - Used in many stress, strain and thermal sensors.
- Early trials found that high speed perforation causes different mode – ‘volume depolarisation’.
  - Produces electrical pulse in microsecond timescale.
- Our tests showed might produce an adequately large signal.
- Might distinguish between high & low speed perforation.

So, commenced new shot trials programmes on PVdF



# Sensor Evaluation - Experimental set-up

## SENSOR




Inserted  
between paper  
insulated target  
plates.

Cu tape as electrical  
connection to 'scope via  
coax.cable

100mm square,  
110 $\mu$ m PVdF sheets

## Paper insulation TARGET ARRAY




Target support  
holes

100mm square 1.6mm  
Al. target plates

# PVdF Sensor - Output


Results of extensive testing - for a range of fragments, at varying speeds (up to 500 m/s & 500 – 2400 m/s)

- Signal characteristics
  - Amplitude correlates with area of PVdF destroyed.
  - Rise time  $\sim$  perforation duration & area of penetrator.
  - Magnitude increasingly strong over range 500-2400m/s.
  - Different character resulting from strikes below 400m/s.
- Concluded that sensor
  - Responds well/reliably to high velocity perforation.
  - Discriminates low velocity perforation.
- Noted 2 Sensors could determine strike velocity (if required).




# Sensor Evaluation – low speed impacts

- Perforation (spigot) & non-perforation (tool drop) test vehicles.




# Sensor – discrimination results



## Sensor Discrimination Evaluation - Conclusions

- Waveform peak from fast bullet/fragment impact:
  - some 100 times greater than peak from spigot intrusion,
  - some 1000 times greater than output from tool drop impact.
- Volume depolarisation mode different to piezo-electric mode
- Discrimination can be achieved by:
  - Tailoring input pulse requirement of a firing control switch to a typical output of a sensor from perforation threats at  $>500\text{m/s}$
  - Imposing a signal amplitude requirement- say of  $>5\text{V}$
  - Imposing a time for perforation (rise time) of a few microseconds. ( $<5$ )
- Thus, a separate discriminator is superfluous for our range-where only need to operate LCC for faster threats.

# CONCEPT – REVISED LAYOUT



Thus, Reduction in discrimination & power components

## Firing sub-system evaluation – Final selection

- We ruled out the following detonator/initiators:
  - EBW & EFI - they have excessive energy requirements.
  - Hot wire devices - as too slow.
  - Conducting composition devices - too sensitive.
- Semiconductor Bridge Devices (SCB) seemed attractive.
  - SCB response times  $< 5\mu\text{s}$  at 50V and 5mJ input.
  - Passed human body discharge simulation (ESD) tests.
  - Also passed No-Fire and insulation resistance tests.
  - Has an All-Fire current of 8.3A,
    - easily achievable from our high velocity perforations.

# Sensor matching to SCB – Trials results

- We had confirmed that a high velocity metal projectile could:
  - Generate 70V & about 50mJ perforating a single PVdF film,
  - Directly be used to initiate an SCB.
- We showed that could NOT initiate SCBs through low velocity fragments (<500m/s), spigot and tool-drop stimuli threats.
- We also tested new targets with several layers of PVdF to ensure a significant overmatch of power requirements.
  - This obviated the use of a separate power source.
- We had achieved objectives & required TRL at this stage of research & could look for applications.



# PROPOSED FINAL CONCEPT



Safety aspects appear challenging; but only at first sight

- Only projectiles fast enough to be hazardous will generate a firing signal for the ECB detonator - False alarms/low velocity strikes not cause output.
- Has ability to still respond correctly after earlier low velocity impacts.
- Could also use a double PVdF sensor:
  - 1<sup>st</sup> sensor identifies a valid threat projectile in velocity via voltage generated at right characteristics,
  - 2<sup>nd</sup> sensor then used to provide correct energy to activate detonator.i.e. Effectively acts as a normal '2-environments' safety device.

## Conclusions of the research effort

- We have demonstrated & tested in a sub-system design, a new, innovative but safe, active mitigation sensor based on PVdF.
- Shown the volume depolarisation of PVdF generates a suitable firing pulse for an SCB detonator when subject to impacts at  $>500\text{m/s}$ .
- Sensor also discriminates against non-threat impacts, based on output signal (as piezoelectric response is of different form).
- No energy storage, conditioning or switching needed.
- Initiator based on PVdF sensor and SCB detonator meets safety standards – at least equivalent to that in many RM igniters.
- Adequate safety ensured to meet the greater risk arising from fragment attack responses – thus is ALARP.

# Reduce Vulnerability – Achieve an IM

- Achievement of IM compliance requires a systems design approach
  - However, designs must consider the trade offs needed
  - “Where, even with a systems approach, it is not possible to achieve full IM compliance, reduction in risk to ALARP becomes the overall objective ..”
- Most often a need to consider Active and Passive mitigation
  - “Mitigation ... can offer a potentially simple and cost effective solution to many systems ..”
- *If there is a choice between having Active mitigation or leaving a system with a severe response – what will you do?*

# *QinetiQ*

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